The second round of large-scale asset purchases by the Federal Reserve-frequently referred to as QE2-included repeated purchases of Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS). To quantify the effect QE2 had on the functioning of the TIPS market and the related market for inflation swaps, we exploit the measure of combined liquidity premiums in TIPS yields and inflation swap rates derived by Christensen and Gillan (2012) . We find that, on TIPS purchase dates, the liquidity premium dropped by 8 to 11 basis points depending on maturity, or about 50 percent. Furthermore, the effect was sustained on nonpurchase dates during most of the program, but dissipated towards its end.
Introduction
In response to the recession induced by the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] , the Federal Reserve quickly lowered its target policy rate-the overnight federal funds rate-effectively to its zero lower bound. Despite this stimulus, the outlook for economic growth remained grim and the threat of significant disinflation, if not outright deflation, high. As a consequence, the Fed began purchases of longer-term securities, also known as quantitative easing (QE), as part of its monetary policy strategy in order to push down longer-term yields and provide additional monetary policy stimulus to the economy.
The success of the Fed's large-scale asset purchases in reducing Treasury yields and mortgage rates appears to be well established; see Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2011) , Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) , and Christensen and Rudebusch (2012) among others. These studies show that yields on longer-maturity Treasuries and other securities declined on days of announcements that indicated the Federal Reserve was planning to increase its holdings of longer-term securities. Such announcement effects are thought to be related to the effects on market expectations about future monetary policy and declines in risk premiums on longer-term debt securities. In addition to the announcement effects, however, it also is possible that the actual purchases of longer-term securities could affect yields by increasing market liquidity and reducing liquidity premiums, at least temporarily.
In this paper, we focus on the purchase or flow effects and analyze how the Fed's second QE program, henceforth QE2, which started in November 2010 and concluded in June 2011, affected the functioning of the market for Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS) and the related market for inflation swap contracts. The unique structure of the execution of the QE2 program provides an interesting natural experiment for studying such flow effects in that the program included biweekly purchases of TIPS with no purchases of any other type of securities on the TIPS operation dates. Equally important, no TIPS were purchased outside the TIPS operation dates.
To motivate the analysis and support the view that flow effects on liquidity premiums from the QE2 TIPS purchases could exist and matter, we note that the existence of TIPS liquidity premiums is well established. Fleming and Krishnan (2012) report market characteristics of TIPS trading that indicate smaller trading volume, longer turnaround time, and wider bid-ask spreads than are normally observed in the nominal Treasury bond market (see also Campbell, Shiller, and Viceira 2009 , Dudley, Roush, and Steinberg Ezer 2009 , Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright 2010 , and Sack and Elsasser 2004 . However, the degree to which they bias TIPS yields remains a topic of debate because attempts to estimate the TIPS liquidity premium directly have resulted in varying results as documented in Christensen and Gillan (2012, henceforth CG) . Instead, to quantify the effects of the TIPS purchases on the TIPS and inflation swap market functioning, we use the sum of TIPS and inflation swap liquidity premiums identified in CG. 1 The measure is model-free and provides a good proxy for the functioning of these two markets independent of the purchase program's effect on market expectations for economic fundamentals. As such, the measure is well suited to capture the changes in TIPS and inflation swap market liquidity that we are interested in.
Our empirical strategy is to use an event study approach where we focus on the changes in market rates from the close of the day before each TIPS purchase operation to the close of the day of the operation. In addition, we control explicitly for other sources known to affect either TIPS and inflation swap market liquidity specifically or bond market liquidity more broadly.
To summarize our results, we find that the TIPS purchase operations had a statistically significant and negative impact on our measure of the combined liquidity premiums in TIPS yields and inflation swap rates. The effect averaged between 8 and 11 basis points depending on maturity. This decline represents close to a 50 percent reduction, suggesting that the QE2 program helped improve market functioning on the TIPS purchase operation dates by reducing liquidity premiums in these two markets. Furthermore, we construct a counterfactual estimate of what our liquidity premium measure would likely have been without the TIPS purchases. The difference with respect to the actual realization suggests that the liquidity effect of the purchases was sustained and had an interesting U-shaped pattern with a peak impact of up to 40 basis points near the middle of the program. We interpret this finding as indicating that part of the effect from QE programs derives from improvements in the market conditions for the targeted security classes.
Our paper relates directly to two recent papers on the flow effects of large-scale asset purchases. The paper closest to ours is the paper by D'Amico and King (2013, henceforth DK) . They find evidence of flow effects in their analysis of the Treasury market response to the $300 billion of Treasury purchases during the Fed's first QE program. 2 They report an average decline in yields in the maturity sector purchased of 3.5 basis points on days when operations occurred. Meaning and Zhu (2011) repeat the analysis of DK for the purchases of regular Treasuries included in the QE2 program. They report that a typical QE2 purchase operation reduced Treasury yields by 4.7 basis points, while the cumulative stock effect of the entire program is estimated to be 20 basis points. Due to the greater depth of the regular Treasury market, it is not surprising that we find flow effects about twice that size in the smaller markets for TIPS and inflation swaps. We also attempt to identify flow effects on TIPS yields directly by replicating the approach of DK and Meaning and Zhu (2011) . However, the estimated coefficients are all insignificant and frequently have the wrong sign. We argue that this outcome is due to misspecification of the time fixed effects in their regression analysis, which does not appropriately account for the price effect of changes to expectations about economic fundamentals on the purchase dates. 3 In our analysis, we avoid the problem of how to deal with changes in expectations about economic fundamentals altogether as they net out in the construction of our liquidity measure, as shown in Section 3.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details the execution of the TIPS purchases included in the QE2 program, while Section 3 describes the construction of the TIPS and inflation swap liquidity premium measure derived in CG. Section 4 lays out our empirical strategy for estimating the effects of the QE2 TIPS purchases, and Section 5 presents our results. Section 6 concludes the paper. Appendices contain additional results and describe our adaptation of DK's approach.
The TIPS Purchases in the QEProgram
In this section, we provide a brief description of the Federal Reserve's QE2 program that included purchases of a sizeable amount of TIPS.
The QE2 program was announced on November 3, 2010. The program expanded the Fed's balance sheet by $600 billion through Treasury security purchases over an approximately eight-month period. In addition, the FOMC had already decided in August 2010 to re-invest principal payments on its portfolio of Treasury and mortgage-backed securities in order to maintain the size of the Fed's balance sheet, a policy that has been continued since then. As a consequence, the gross purchases of Treasury securities from November 3, 2010, until June 29, 2011, totaled nearly $750 billion, of which TIPS purchases represented about $26 billion.
The uniqueness of these TIPS purchases is evident in Figure 1 (a), which shows the total book value of the Fed's TIPS holdings since 2008. Both before and after the QE2 program, the Fed's holdings of TIPS were very stable. The TIPS purchases included as part of the program increased the Fed's holdings by 52.8 percent and brought the total close to $75 billion. 4 Figure   1 (b) shows the market share of individual TIPS held by the Fed at the beginning and end of QE2. Note that the purchases were not heavily concentrated in any particular TIPS, and the Fed's TIPS holdings as a percentage of the stock of each security in general remained well below one-third. Rather, the low holdings and purchases of three-to five-year TIPS stand out, as we will see later in the empirical analysis.
The QE2 program was implemented with a very regular schedule. Once a month, the Fed publicly released a list of operation dates for the following 30-plus day period, indicating 3 As the purchases of Treasuries in both the QE1 and QE2 programs were much more frequent, any bias from the misspecified time fixed effects is more likely to average out in the analysis of DK and Meaning and Zhu (2011) , which might explain why they get stronger results. 4 The slight decline in mid-April 2011 is due to a maturing five-year TIPS of which the Fed was holding $2.9 billion in principal and $327 million in accrued inflation compensation. the relevant maturity range and expected purchase amount for each operation. 5 There were 15 separate TIPS operation dates, fairly evenly distributed across time, each with a stated expected purchase amount of $1 to $2 billion. TIPS were the only type of asset purchased on these dates, and the Fed did not acquire any TIPS outside of those dates during the course of the program. Furthermore, all outstanding TIPS with a minimum of two years remaining to maturity were eligible for purchase on each operation date, so we need not account for price movements of specific securities related to the release of the operation schedules. Finally, market participants did not know in advance either the total amount to be purchased or the distribution of purchases. However, the auction results containing this information were released a few minutes after each auction. As the auctions closed at 11:00 a.m. Eastern time, investors had sufficient time to digest the information before the close of the market on each operation date. This motivates our use of one-day response windows, though we also consider two-day responses for robustness. changes in the control variables shown in the last three columns of Table 1 also have mixed signs, which highlights the importance of using statistical regressions to assess the effect of the QE2 TIPS purchases on our liquidity premium measure.
A first indication that the TIPS purchases could have had an impact on TIPS market functioning is provided in Figure 2 , which shows the weekly average of the daily trading volume in the secondary TIPS market as reported by primary dealers to the New York Fed; also shown is the smoother eight-week moving average. While TIPS trading volume did increase notably during the course of the program, we are interested in the flow effects of the TIPS purchases rather than the volume of securities traded; that is, the effect the purchases had on liquidity premiums in the market for TIPS and the related market for inflation swap contracts on these purchase operation dates. To do so, we exploit the model-independent measure of the sum of liquidity premiums in TIPS and inflation swaps described in the following section. Weekly average of daily trading volume in the secondary market for TIPS (dashed black line) and the smoothed eight-week moving average (solid black line).
A Measure of Liquidity Premiums in TIPS and Inflation

Swaps
In this section, we describe how we construct the measure of liquidity premiums in TIPS yields and inflation swap rates that we use as dependent variables in our empirical analysis.
Since its inception in 1997, the market for TIPS has grown steadily and, as of the end of 2012, represented 7.7 percent of the total market for tradable U.S. Treasury securities. 6 Unlike regular Treasury securities that pay fixed coupons and a fixed nominal amount at maturity, TIPS deliver a real payoff because their principal and coupon payments are adjusted for inflation. 7
The difference in yield between regular nominal, or non-indexed, Treasury bonds and TIPS of the same maturity is referred to as breakeven inflation (BEI), since it is the level of inflation that makes investments in indexed and non-indexed bonds equally profitable.
If TIPS provide good inflation protection (i.e., they protect the value of bond investors' 6 According to the Bureau of the Public Debt, the total outstanding notional value of TIPS was $849 billion as of the end of December 2012, which should be compared to $11.03 trillion in total marketable Treasury securities. The data are available at: www.TreasuryDirect.gov.
7 The U.S. Treasury uses the change in the headline consumer price index (CPI) to account for inflation compensation.
portfolios when inflation exceeds its expected path) and are considered valuable for that reason, TIPS yields will be low and BEI correspondingly high as investors are willing to pay a premium to avoid being exposed to inflation risk. On the other hand, if TIPS suffer from poor liquidity or are perceived to provide a poor hedge against positive inflation surprises, TIPS yields will tend to be high and BEI correspondingly low as investors require a premium to hold TIPS in their portfolio. For a given outlook for inflation, these two effects cause estimates of the liquidity premium to vary but in offsetting ways, which makes it hard to identify one effect from the other by just observing nominal and real yields in isolation. The contribution of CG is to add information on so-called inflation swap rates to get a handle on the size of the liquidity premiums in TIPS yields and inflation swap rates jointly.
In a long position of an inflation swap contract, the investor pays a fixed premium in exchange for a floating payment equal to the change in the consumer price index used in the inflation indexation of TIPS. At inception, the fixed premium is set such that the contract has a value of zero. In a frictionless world, the absence of arbitrage implies the inflation swap rate must equal the TIPS breakeven inflation because buying one nominal zero-coupon bond today with a given maturity produces the same cash flow as buying one real zero-coupon bond of the same maturity and selling an inflation swap contract also of the same maturity.
However, in reality, the trading of both TIPS and inflation swap contracts is impeded by frictions, such as wider bid-ask spreads and less liquidity relative to the market for regular nominal Treasury bonds. As a consequence, the difference between inflation swap rates and BEI will not be zero, but instead represents a measure of how far these markets are from the frictionless outcome described above. Figure 3 shows this difference at the five-and ten-year maturity since 2005 constructed using BEI from the Wright (2007, 2010) databases of nominal Treasury and real TIPS yields combined with zero-coupon inflation swap rates from Bloomberg. 8 Under the assumptions that TIPS and inflation swaps are less liquid than nominal Treasuries, CG show that these strictly positive series represent the sum of liquidity premiums in TIPS yields and inflation swap rates relative to the implicit, unobserved liquidity premiums in regular Treasury bonds. Importantly, this is a model-independent result that relies only on the two assumptions above. Furthermore, CG present comprehensive evidence that both assumptions are satisfied; specifically, market size, trading volume, and bid-ask spreads all indicate that regular Treasury securities are much more liquid than both TIPS and inflation swaps.
In the empirical analysis, it is the response of this liquidity measure to the TIPS purchases in the QE2 program that we are interested in analyzing. Importantly, in the construction of 
Empirical Strategy
In this section, we describe how we quantify the effect of the QE2 TIPS purchases on our TIPS and inflation swap liquidity premium measure.
Our empirical strategy is to use an event study approach, where we focus on the changes in market rates from the close of the day before each TIPS purchase operation to the close of the day of the operation. The idea is to minimize the noise from other unrelated sources that might affect our liquidity measure. In addition, we need to control explicitly for sources that we do know affect the measure. Specifically, we include five variables that reflect either TIPS and inflation swap market liquidity specifically or bond market liquidity more broadly.
The first variable we consider is the VIX options-implied volatility index. It represents near-term uncertainty about the general stock market as reflected in options on the Standard & Poor's 500 stock price index and is widely used as a gauge of investor fear and risk aversion.
The motivation for including this variable is that elevated economic uncertainty would imply increased uncertainty about the future resale price of any security and therefore could cause Illustration of the VIX options-implied volatility index for the S&P 500 stock price index with a comparison to the five-year liquidity premium measure. Note that the former is measured in percent and multiplied by two to make its scale comparable to the latter, which is measured in basis points. liquidity premiums that represent investors' guard against such uncertainty to go up. As shown in Figure 4 , the VIX has a high, positive correlation with our liquidity measure as expected.
The second variable included is the yield difference between seasoned (off-the-run) Treasury securities and the most recently issued (on-the-run) Treasury security of similar maturity.
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate these series at the five-and ten-year maturities, respectively.
In each case, the off-the-run spread is compared with the corresponding liquidity premium measure of the same maturity, and in our regressions, we also match the maturity in this way. For each maturity sector in the Treasury yield curve, the on-the-run security is typically the most traded security and therefore penalized the least in terms of liquidity premiums, which explains the mostly positive spread. For our analysis, the important thing to note is that if there is a wide yield spread between liquid on-the-run and comparable seasoned Treasuries, we would expect to also see large liquidity premiums in TIPS yields and inflation swap rates relative to those in the Treasury bond market, i.e., a widening of our liquidity premium measure.
The third variable used is the excess yield of AAA-rated U.S. industrial corporate bonds over comparable Treasury yields shown in Figure 6 . We note that in choosing the maturity we face a trade-off. On one side, we would ideally like to match the maturity of our liquidity premium measure. However, the credit risk of even AAA-rated industrial bond issuers cannot be deemed negligible at a five-to ten-year horizon. On the other hand, if we focus on very short-term debt where the credit risk is entirely negligible, we are far from the desired maturity range. We believe using the two-year credit spread strikes a reasonable balance, and the results are not sensitive to this particular choice. As the credit risk component of such highly rated shorter-term corporate bond yields is minimal, the yield spread largely reflects the premium bond investors require for being exposed to the lower trading volume and larger bid-ask spreads in the corporate bond market vis-à-vis the liquid Treasury bond market. Again, if such illiquidity premiums of high-quality corporate bonds are large, we could expect both TIPS yields and inflation swap rates to contain wide liquidity premiums.
The fourth variable considered is the bid-ask spreads of TIPS and inflation swap contracts.
The microstructure frictions that such spreads represent could potentially account for a sizeable part of the variation in our liquidity premium measure, and we want to control for that. numbers reported elsewhere, 9 the bid-ask spreads for the TIPS appear suspiciously low and stable before the spring of 2011. 10 For this reason, we include the bid-ask spreads only for the inflation swaps in our regressions, and, as with the off-the-run spread, we use the five-and ten-year bid-ask spreads in the five-and ten-year liquidity premium regressions, respectively.
The final variable is the weekly average of the daily trading volume in the secondary market for TIPS as reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and shown in Figure   2 . We use the eight-week moving average to smooth out short-term volatility. This measure should have a negative effect on our liquidity premium measure as increases in TIPS trading volume should, in most cases, drive down TIPS and inflation swap liquidity premiums.
By including these five control variables, our regression results will reveal what effect the TIPS purchase operations had on TIPS and inflation swap liquidity premiums beyond their effect on the liquidity of regular Treasury securities and corporate bonds. However, as the TIPS auction dates did not involve any purchases of regular Treasury securities, the one-day 9 For example, these numbers are close to the order of transaction costs in the inflation swap market reported by Fleckenstein, Longstaff, and Lustig (2012) based on conversations with traders.
10 Haubrich, Pennacchi, and Ritchken (2012) report bid-ask spreads for ten-year TIPS, which are higher than the Bloomberg data, in particular around the peak of the financial crisis in the fall of 2008 and early 2009. Unfortunately, their series ends in May 2010 and cannot be used for our analysis. Illustration of the bid-ask spread as reported by Bloomberg for the most recently issued, or so-called onthe-run, five-and ten-year TIPS. Shown are also the bid-ask spreads from the inflation swap market for the five-and ten-year zero-coupon inflation swap contracts. All series are smoothed four-week moving averages and measured in basis points. event window we use should at least minimize, if not entirely eliminate, any such feedback effects.
To capture the one-day response of our liquidity premium measure to the TIPS operations, we include a standard indicator variable for the 15 TIPS purchase operations jointly. This variable allows us to capture the difference in the closing value of the measure from the day before each TIPS operation to the day of the operation. We also explore the two-day responses to detect whether there is any reversal in the effects, which is likely because the Fed purchased regular Treasury securities on the other weekdays around the TIPS operation dates. 11 Those purchases should improve the liquidity of regular Treasury securities relative to TIPS and hence put upward pressure on our liquidity premium measure.
Finally, we look at the overall impact of the purchase program by constructing a counterfactual of our liquidity premium measure for the period over which the program was conducted. We use the same five variables as in the event study and estimate the relationships quantify what the liquidity measure would have been over the remainder of the sample had the TIPS purchases not been undertaken. The difference between the observed series and the counterfactual represents the best guess from our regression model of the sustained effect of the TIPS purchase operations on our liquidity premium measure.
Results
In this section, we first present empirical results from a set of baseline regressions. Second, we describe our robustness tests before proceeding to the counterfactual analysis that attempts to quantify what our liquidity premium measure would have been without the QE2 TIPS purchases. We end the section with a replication of the approach used by DK to attempt to identify any flow effects from the TIPS purchases on TIPS yields directly.
Baseline Regressions
The results for regressions with a standard indicator variable for the one-day response on the 15 TIPS purchase dates jointly are reported in Table 2 . Regression 4 with all five control variables is used as the baseline regression in the remainder of the section. However, regressions 1 to 3 show that the effect of the various controlling variables is robust across different specifications of the regressions.
In terms of the estimated coefficients of the control variables, they all have the right sign and are statistically significant in all four regressions with a single exception at the five-year maturity, where the off-over on-the-run yield spread has a negative coefficient. 12 As expected, positive changes in the VIX and the credit spread of AAA-rated industrial corporate bonds are both associated with increases in the liquidity premium measures, while increases in the daily trading volume of TIPS tend to coincide with a compression of the liquidity premium measures. Finally, an uptick in the bid-ask spreads of inflation swaps is positively correlated with a widening of the liquidity premium measure.
As for the one-day response dummy variable for the TIPS purchase operations, we find that the TIPS operations during the QE2 program had a statistically significant negative impact on the liquidity premium measures on the days of the purchases. The estimated decline in the baseline regression is 11 basis points at the five-year maturity and 8 basis points at the ten-year maturity. Considering that the averages of the five-and ten-year liquidity measures over the purchase period were 22.3 and 15.8 basis points, respectively, these seem like sizeable reductions of about 50 percent. This suggests that the TIPS purchases did improve TIPS and inflation swap market functioning on the TIPS purchase operation dates once we control 12 This might not be surprising given that the off-over on-the-run yield spread at the five-year maturity is relatively modest in size and switches sign fairly frequently as seen in Figure 5 (a). for factors that would have affected our liquidity premium measure independent of the QE2 operations.
Regarding the potential for endogeneity in the regressions, if the TIPS purchases happened to reduce the bid-ask spreads of inflation swaps or increase TIPS trading volume, the coefficient on the purchase binary variable would underestimate the effect of the purchases because part of it would be accounted for indirectly by those variables based on the sign of their estimated coefficients. 13 Thus, the reported results should be viewed as conservative estimates of the effects of the TIPS purchases on our liquidity premium measures. The same holds for the result of the counterfactual analysis in Section 5.3.
Robustness Checks
In this section, we carry out a number of additional regressions as robustness checks.
Our first robustness check is to replace the one-day response indicator variable with a twoday response variable. Using a two-day window, the results indicate that the point estimates do not change, while the statistical significance actually increases. As such, the interpretation and the magnitude remain intact with a two-day response window. Furthermore, all 13 We thank Fred Furlong for pointing this out.
other coefficients barely change. In a related robustness check, we use two separate indicator variables, one that captures the reaction of the liquidity measures on the days with TIPS purchases, and one for the reaction the following day. If the purchases only push down the liquidity measures temporarily on the days of the TIPS purchases, we should expect to see a reversal already the following day, i.e., the dummy variable for the second-day response should have a positive coefficient. The results for these regressions show that the TIPS purchases had longer-lasting negative effects on our measures of liquidity premiums in the TIPS and inflation swap markets as there is no positive coefficient for the second-day dummy. On the contrary, its estimated coefficient has the same sign and is only slightly smaller than the coefficient of the first-day indicator variable. Later in this paper, we will study the persistence of the purchase effect in greater detail using a counterfactual analysis.
As an alternative, we weight the indicator variable for each operation date by the ratio of the amount of TIPS purchased relative to the market value of the entire TIPS market.
In general, the results do not differ much from our baseline result in the sense that the sign and significance of the purchase indicator variable are little affected. As neither the amount of TIPS purchased nor the value of the TIPS market varied much across time, the totalpurchase-weighted dummy exhibits only modest time variation (shown with solid black bars in Figure 8 ), which explains its similarity with to the results from using just a standard indicator variable.
We further include two weighted indicator variables in each regression. The first variable is weighted by the fraction of TIPS purchased with four to six years remaining to maturity relative to the total market value of TIPS in that maturity range. The second variable repeats this using the eight-to ten-year maturity range. The weights for the two indicator variables are shown in Figure 8 with dark and light gray bars, respectively, while the regression results are reported in Table 3 .
We note that the indicator variable weighted based on the fraction of the four-to six-year TIPS market purchased is uniformly insignificant and most of the time has the wrong sign.
On the other hand, the indicator variable weighted based on the fraction of the eight-to tenyear TIPS market purchased has the right sign and is highly statistically significant and about the same size at both maturities. Combined with the significance of the standard indicator variables reported in Table 2 , this suggests that the effects of purchases in one maturity sector may be able to spill over into neighboring maturity sectors and is consistent with similar findings for the regular Treasury bond market reported by DK. Additionally, the estimated coefficients in this case can be interpreted quite nicely. For the ten-year maturity sector, the liquidity premiums in the TIPS and inflation swap markets decline by about 15 basis points for each percentage point of that segment of the TIPS market purchased. Purchases of that magnitude also depress the liquidity premium measure at the five-year maturity by about the same magnitude.
To explain the difference in the results for the two weighted dummies, Figure 8 shows the weights for each of the 15 operation dates. Note that the purchases of four-to six-year TIPS were small, with few exceptions, even relative to the total size of that maturity sector.
Hence, it appears reasonable that purchases of such tiny magnitudes have essentially no effect on the size of liquidity premiums in the markets for these securities. In the eight-to tenyear maturity sector, on the other hand, purchases were much more material and, on several occasions, represented more than 1 percent of the entire market in that maturity range. With purchases of that magnitude, it is not surprising that our liquidity measure responds, and significantly so, in a downward direction. Ultimately, though, the interesting question is whether these significant negative one-day effects of the 15 TIPS purchase operations during the QE2 program had a lasting downward effect on the measure of TIPS and inflation swap liquidity premiums, a question we now address. The table reports the results of regressions with the TIPS and inflation swap liquidity premiums at the five-and ten-year maturity as the dependent variables and five measures of market functioning as explanatory variables. Included is a dummy variable for the 15 dates with TIPS purchase operations weighted by the amount of TIPS purchased in the 4-6 year sector relative to the total market value of all TIPS outstanding in that maturity sector. A similar dummy variable for the 8-10 year sector is also included. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Counterfactual Analysis
To address the question of whether the TIPS purchases included in the QE2 program caused a persistent reduction in our liquidity measure, we use the preferred baseline regression in Table   2 with all five control variables included, but estimate the coefficients on the sample ending on November 2, 2010, the day before the announcement of the QE2 program. By fixing the coefficients at those estimated values and using the subsequent realizations of the five control variables, we get an estimate of the most likely counterfactual path for our liquidity premium measure, had the QE2 program not included TIPS purchases. Figure 9 shows the realized liquidity measure at the five-and ten-year maturities as well as the corresponding estimated counterfactual paths constructed in this way. As noted in the figure, there is a sizeable wedge between the counterfactual path and the actual realization during the period from November Comparison of the observed and counterfactual liquidity measures at the five-and ten-year maturity, respectively.
the TIPS purchases, maybe with the exception of the bid-ask spreads of inflation swaps and the TIPS trading volume series. Still, even if there is such feedback in these two variables, it would go against us finding any effects based on the sign of their estimated coefficients as explained at the end of Section 5.1. Figure 10 puts the difference between the actual realization and the counterfactual into sharper focus for the duration of the QE2 program. Our counterfactual exercise indicates that the average of our liquidity measure would have been 13.7 and 11.7 basis points higher over the period of the purchase program at the five-and ten-year maturities, respectively, and up to 40 basis points higher during the middle third of the program coinciding with turmoil about sovereign debt in southern peripheral countries in the euro area that would normally have pushed our liquidity measure higher. Interestingly, the realized measure declines relative to the counterfactual over the first third of the program and then increases back to its level at the program start in a fairly symmetric fashion, indicating that market participants repeatedly priced the liquidity premiums of TIPS and inflation swaps lower for the first half of the program before gradually returning to pre-program levels. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients and fit for the pre-program period are consistent with those for the entire sample used in the event-study with the purchase dummy variables, confirming the robustness of the counterfactual construction. 14 This suggests that, in addition to the statistically significant one-day responses in the event study, the persistent effect of the purchases seems to have 14 The estimated coefficients are reported in Appendix A. reduced liquidity premiums in the TIPS and inflation swap markets over the duration of the QE2 program.
To provide context for the difference between the observed and counterfactual path over the period from November 3, 2010, to June 30, 2011, we calculate the moving average of the in-sample fitted errors from the regression used in the construction of the counterfactual path over periods of similar length as the QE2 period (165 daily observation dates). Figure 11 shows these series for the five-and ten-year maturities along with the average of the counterfactual errors during the QE2 program indicated with solid gray horizontal lines. We note that it is unprecedented to have a sustained difference of this magnitude simultaneously at the fiveand ten-year maturities. This supports the conclusion that the QE2 TIPS purchases pushed the liquidity premium measures to unusually low levels.
Local Supply Effects in the TIPS Market
In this section, we attempt to estimate any direct effects on TIPS yields from the QE2 TIPS purchases by replicating the approach of DK.
Assuming the purchased securities are held for a considerable period of time, QE purchases are effectively equivalent to a reduction in the available stock of the targeted securi- ties. The empirical question is whether fluctuations in the supply of government debt should affect yields. Under the expectations hypothesis and in standard term structure models, such supply effects are ruled out. However, models with imperfect asset substitutability or preferred-habitat investors allow for local supply effects on bond yields (see DK for a detailed discussion). Still, as is evident from Figure 12 , which shows the changes in the five-and ten-year Treasury and TIPS yields around the time of the QE2 program, the naked eye is a poor guide for detecting such supply effects as both nominal and real yields increased on net during the QE2 program, but the latter less than the former causing BEI to widen as well.
Thus, again, a statistical model is needed to tease out any effects from the asset purchases against this backdrop of generally rising yields. By using security-level data one might hope to be able to identify local supply effects and how they vary across securities with different maturities and liquidity characteristics. To do so, we replicate the approach of DK as briefly summarized in the following. 15 However, we note up front that, unlike the analysis so far, the key element in their approach is to control appropriately for changes in expectations about monetary policy and other economic fundamentals that may affect TIPS yields independent of QE2. Below we will discuss the complications this might bring.
To begin, we follow DK and conduct the regressions in price changes rather than yield 15 All details are provided in Appendix B. changes due to significant variation in coupon rates and maturities across TIPS. Second, we drop all TIPS with less than two years remaining to maturity at the beginning of the QE2 program because TIPS near maturity have rather erratic price behavior due to the seasonality and general unpredictability of shocks to the headline consumer price index. 16 Third, unlike DK, we only have three maturity buckets related to each security, namely (1) the security itself, (2) the near substitutes with maturities within two years of that of the security, and (3) the far substitutes whose maturities are more than two years from that of the security.
Next, we run regressions of the daily percentage price change of each TIPS security n, denoted R n (t), on a set of variables:
where q n 0 (t) represents the normalized amount purchased of security n itself, q n 1 (t) is the normalized amount purchased of near substitutes for security n, while q n 2 (t) is the normalized amount purchased of far substitutes for security n. Thus, the corresponding coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities where γ 0 is security n's price elasticity to own purchases, γ 1 is its price elasticity to purchases of near substitutes, and γ 2 is its price elasticity to purchases of far substitutes. Finally, δ(t) and α n represent time and security fixed effects, respectively. The table reports the results of regressions of the flow effects from the QE2 TIPS purchases as described in the text. The first column reports the results of using all available TIPS with more than two years to maturity, while the following two columns report the result of splitting that sample into one subsample with TIPS with less than ten years to maturity, and one subsample with TIPS with more than ten years to maturity. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Table 4 reports the regression results for the full sample using all available TIPS with more than two years to maturity as well as the results from the two subsamples with TIPS with less (more) than ten years to maturity. 17 Overall, the results are disappointing. Most of the coefficients of the purchase elasticities do not even have the right sign, and none of them are statistically significant at conventional levels. In short, it is hard to detect any local supply effects in TIPS yields directly.
Various explanations could account for this outcome. First, as emphasized by DK, according to the theory of local supply effects in bond markets (see Vayanos and Vila 2009), they are more likely to matter when liquidity and market functioning is poor, i.e., when the arbitrageurs who trade away profit opportunities along the yield curve are capital constrained and for that reason only take on the most profitable trades, but not all available arbitrages.
As noted in Figure 3 , our measure of TIPS and inflation swap market functioning had reached pre-crisis levels well before the announcement of the QE2 program. Thus, it is indeed possible that market functioning could have been restored and local supply effects would be small for that reason. However, this explanation would contradict our previous results. More likely, we think that there are issues with the specification of the time fixed effects represented by δ(t). This specification provides a poor proxy for changes in the shape of the yield curve on purchase dates. For example, a level shift in the TIPS yield curve will affect the prices of long-maturity TIPS in a very different way than the prices of short-maturity TIPS. 18 By contrast, the time fixed effect imposes an identical price response across all TIPS. In addition, the security fixed effects represented by α n do not mitigate any of this as they are constant through time. Furthermore, the bias from this misspecification might be more severe in our case than in the analysis of DK for two reasons. First, our pool of TIPS is smaller and more heterogeneous than their sample of regular Treasuries that is dominated by securities with three to ten years remaining to maturity. 19 Second, the limited number of purchase dates in our analysis could matter as well since it allows for less averaging of any errors induced by the misspecified time fixed effects.
To summarize, we believe there are compelling reasons why we are not able to identify any flow effects on individual TIPS prices from the QE2 TIPS purchases using the approach of DK, despite the clear results we obtain when we analyze the effects on our TIPS and inflation swap liquidity measure. The key difference is that our approach is unaffected by changes to expectations about economic fundamentals, whereas the DK approach could be severely biased by them.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the effects TIPS purchases included in the Fed's QE2 program had on the functioning of the market for TIPS and the related market for inflation swaps. Using the model-independent measure of the sum of liquidity premiums in TIPS yields and inflation swap rates derived in CG, we find that the TIPS purchases appear to have negatively affected the liquidity premiums in the market for TIPS and inflation swaps, that is, they helped reduce the liquidity premiums for these securities. Our counterfactual analysis suggests that they persistently depressed the liquidity premium measure by an average of 12 to 14 basis points for the duration of the program from what we would otherwise have expected it to be. This represents a considerable reduction in our view. Importantly for our interpretation, by the end of the program, the liquidity premium measure had returned to pre-program levels. This leads us to conclude that one benefit of the QE2 program was to improve financial market functioning by reducing liquidity premiums through a direct purchase effect.
Unfortunately, our empirical analysis does not identify what part of the improvement is due to reductions in TIPS liquidity premiums as opposed to reductions in the liquidity premiums in inflation swap rates. Our adaptation of the approach of DK also failed to deliver any significant results regarding this issue. Thus, we leave that challenging question for future research.
Another underresearched area is the extent to which the documented improvement in market functioning extends beyond the safest assets such as Treasuries, TIPS, and mortgagebacked securities. In particular, the impact on the functioning of the corporate bond markets would be interesting to study because any improvement in the efficiency of their pricing would translate into real economic benefits as firms could obtain external financing at lower costs.
Again, we leave this important question for future research. 
Appendix A: Regression Results Used in Counterfactual Analysis
In the construction of our counterfactual, we rely on the historical connection between our liquidity measure and the five explanatory variables we use. Table 5 reports the results for the baseline regressions using the pre-QE2 part of our data sample, i.e., the sample from In this appendix, we describe our adaptation of DK's analysis of flow effects from QE purchases.
First, we introduce notation and define the fundamental statistical objects, which are as follows: (i ) . N is the total number of TIPS in existence during the QE2 program.
(ii ). O n (t) equals the notional amount of security n outstanding at t, n ∈ {1, . . . , N }.
(iii ). Q n (t) equals the dollar amount of security n purchased at t, n ∈ {1, . . . , N }.
(iv ). R n (t) = P n (t)−P n (t−1)
is the daily percentage price change of security n at time t, n ∈ {1, . . . , N }.
(v ). T n is the maturity date of security n, n ∈ {1, . . . , N }.
The second step is to calculate the variables to be used as input in the subsequent regressions. Similar to DK, for each security n, we define buckets of substitutes, but limit the number to three buckets due to the smaller number of TIPS trading relative to the number of securities in the market for regular Treasury securities.
As in DK, the first bucket is denoted S0(n) and just contains security n itself. Related to bucket 0 we define two variables:
(i ). O n 0 (t) = O n (t) is the notional amount of security n outstanding.
(ii ). Q n 0 (t) = Q n (t) is the amount of security n purchased at time t.
The second bucket is denoted S1(n) and contains all securities with maturities within two years of the maturity of security n, i.e., S1(n) = {m : |T m − T n | ≤ 2}. Following DK we refer to these securities as the near substitutes for security n.
Finally, the third bucket is denoted S2(n) and contains all securities with a difference in maturity of more than two years relative to the maturity of security n, i.e., S2(n) = {m : |T m − T n | > 2}. Again, using language similar to DK, we refer to these securities as the far substitutes for security n.
Related to the last two buckets, the following variables are defined:
(i ). O n i (t) = m∈S i (n) O m (t) is the notional amount outstanding of bucket i substitutes for security n at time t, i ∈ {1, 2}.
(ii ). Q n i (t) = m∈S i (n) Q m (t) is the amount of bucket i substitutes for security n purchased at time t, i ∈ {1, 2}.
As in DK, we use normalized variables in the regressions:
is the amount of security n purchased at time t relative to the notional amount outstanding of security n itself and its near substitutes.
(ii ). q n i (t) =
is the amount of bucket i substitutes for security n purchased at time t relative to the notional amount outstanding of security n itself and its near substitutes, i ∈ {1, 2}.
Finally, similar to DK, we run regressions of the daily percentage price change of each TIPS security on a set of variables:
R n (t) = γ0q n 0 (t) + γ1q n 1 (t) + γ2q n 2 (t) + δ(t) + α n + ε n (t), where
• γ0 is security n's price elasticity to own purchases,
• γ1 is security n's price elasticity to purchases of near substitutes,
• γ2 is security n's price elasticity to purchases of far substitutes,
• δ(t) represents time fixed effects, and
• α n represents security fixed effects.
